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Today Poland remains one of the few states that not only declare but do their best to enhance their
strategic partnership with Ukraine. Although Ukraine's strategic partners are numerous, they have little
in common except the declared fact of strategic partnership. Following the statements of President of
Ukraine Leonid Kuchma, they are many and various: Russia and the United States (according to
President Kuchma's repeated assurances), Uzbekistan (announced to be a strategic partner by Kuchma
on November 11, 1995), and "multipartisan" China (Leonid Kuchma's statement of March 29, 1996),
and Japan (Leonid Kuchma's statement of December 30, 1996).
Meanwhile, the President of Ukraine gave Great Britain, Argentina and the Netherlands only the status
of "special partners. Only once - on January 12, 1996 - President Kuchma dropped the "strategic"
perspective and referred to Poland simply as to a "special partner". Probably, it was just a slip of the
tongue, as the Ukrainian-Polish relations may be regarded as an example of the strategic partnership
Ukraine needs.
Polish President Aleksandr Kwasniewsky's visit to Ukraine - the fourth since January 1998 - does not
demand any special summing up, as well as multiple other routine instances of the Polish-Ukrainian
relations like the production of a Polish "Bizon" tractors by the Kharkiv-based Malyshev plant or
Polish specialists' acquaintance with the Kharkiv Aircraft plant's production cycle. The two Presidents'
visit to the place in the vicinity of Kharkiv where political prisoners and Polish officers and soldiers
were shot in 1940 and the joint act of placing the first stone to the basement of a memorial to victims of
totalitarianism are the parts of the historic peace-making started by the Ukrainian-Polish Declaration on
Reconciliation and Cooperation signed on May 21, 1998. The two leaders participated in the ceremony
of putting flowers to the Polish graves at the Lychakivske cemetery in Lviv and opened the plaque in
Jaworzno at the place where Ukrainian victims of the Visla operation died in the concentration camp.
There may be other actions to settle the mutual grievances associated in the two peoples' consciousness
with Przemysl and Helm, Volyn and Kharkiv. The policy, the aim of which was clearly formulated by
President Kwasniewsky as "building bridges of understanding, closing down very complicated
problems that have lasted for years [and] centuries", will continue as long as the two states need it.
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk once said he shared Zbigniew Brzezinsky's view that
France and Germany had made the after-war Western Europe and acted as catalysts of the unification.
Tarasiuk also added that "developing the analogy, one may say that Ukraine and Poland can do in
central and Eastern Europe what was once done by France and Germany." Taking into account the fact
that President Kwasniewsky has repeatedly stressed publicly that "not a single month passes without
our meeting with President Kuchma" one may conclude that the French-German relations were chosen
as a model for the Ukrainian-Polish ones: the burden of historic grievances is similarly heavy,
therefore, the French and German leaders had to meet very often, even more often than every month.
Aleksandr Kwasniewsky's visit to Ukraine in June 1998 is yet another episode in the development of
the Ukrainian-Polish relations which have been marked by a number of achievements, including
Ukraine's cooperation with the Vizegrad Three (later transformed into the Vizegrad Four), involvement
in the Central European Initiative and the Polish leaders' multiple statements that their country supports
Ukraine in the issues of cooperation with, and future membership of the EU. The developing
understanding includes the Ukrainian President's statements that Ukraine and Poland "view NATO not
as a defence union, but as a collective security mechanism that unites democratic states", and activities
of the Presidential Polish-Ukrainian Consultative Committee, and consultations of the Secretary of the
Ukrainian National Security and Defence Council with heads of the Polish National Security Agency.
Success of the Ukrainian-Polish relations is manifested in the statement, made by President Kuchma at
the meetings with heads of diplomatic missions in January 1998, that "joint statements of Presidents of
Poland and Ukraine" were among "the most important foreign policy events of 1997" together with the
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership with the Russian Federation, the Treaty of
Cooperation with Romania and the border agreements with Belarus. No other state leader of a new
Eastern European democracy has made as radical statement in support of Ukraine as the one made by
President Kwasniewsky in Helsinki in May 1998: the West should be more determined in assisting
Ukraine, as the price of the West's unwillingness to open up its purse may be instability in a country
with 52 million inhabitants. He argued that in the case of Ukraine the funds are needed to ensure the
"initial leap" and added that the risk is too high.
Also important are the developments of the Ukrainian-Polish relations outside the official policy
framework. All public initiatives carried out by representatives of the two countries - like the almost
forgotten initiative of the Ukrainian Republican Party, numerous Polish-Ukrainian fora and the
participation of the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine in the International Committee for Protection
of Democracy in Belarus together with Belarusian, Swedish, German, Austrian and Polish Social
Democrats - represent normal relations of two states that cooperate on the levels of state leaders,
parties, the media and business communities and individuals. The general picture is made complete by
incidents like reproduction by the extreme right Polish newspaper "Dziennik Katolicky" of an appeal
"To Peoples, Parliaments, Governments of Ukraine, Belarus, Israel, Poland, Russia, Slovakia,
Yugoslavia" issued by a group of Ukrainian MPs and signed by Communist leader P. Symonenko, V.
Cherepkov, H. Dolzhenko and E. Marmazov. The "appeal" warned of "fascism in Ukraine",
"reconstruction and strengthening of national-fascist organizations", "heroisation of terrible crimes".
Other details of the partnership include consultancy offered by Director General of the United Energy
Systems of Ukraine (UESU) Hennady Tymoshenko to Polish Minister of Oil Industry, according to
Tymoshenko's own statement in the press in May 1997.
Aleksandr Kwasniewsky's visit is a reason to analyze the current status of the Ukrainian-Polish
relations. Zbigniew Brzezinsky's view that if Central Europe had to choose between joining NATO in
conditions of Ukraine's subordination to Moscow or staying out of NATO provided Ukraine remained
independent, the second option would be more secure, apparently, is shared by many Poles, who
cooperate with Americans in the strategic triangle USA-Poland-Ukraine. Like no other Central or
Eastern European state, Poland coordinates its activities with the United States. However, today Poles
are facing the need to combine their new commitments that will follow their country's membership in
the EU with repeated promises to Ukraine that Poland's movement to Europe will not have a negative
effect on Ukraine's interests.
In March 1998, President Kwasniewsky announced that "after Poland joins the EU, no new dividing
line will emerge at the Ukrainian-Polish border". However, the EU demands that the border be closed
and visas be introduced for travellers from the East; therefore, Poles, while insisting there will be no
new "iron curtain" but a "friendly border" are prepared to obey. Until it is clear how Poland plans to
maintain the current status of the Ukrainian-Polish border and avoid criticism of the EU, it is important
to remember the words President Kuchma said in May 1998: "If the joint search for solutions of this
complex, acute and sensitive problem is not begun today, it may seriously slow down development of
ties between our countries." The best - though unrealistic now - solution that would suit both parties
would be Ukraine's associate membership in the European Union - the goal declared by the Ukrainian
Foreign Minister and then the Prime Minister, and supported by statements of the Polish President.
However, then it is unclear how Ukraine intends to introduce visa arrangements with Russia and
Belarus, but that is not the issue of Ukrainian-Polish relations.
It is also important to note that Ukraine's international reputation is not as high as Poland's although
Ukraine and Poland compete for importance in views of Western politicians and the media. Poland,
apparently, is concerned about Ukraine's reputation. Kwasniewsky's Helsinki statement went on as
follows: one may agree to the view of financiers that before investments pour into a country it should
demonstrate commitment to reforms. The formulation suggests that the Polish President, while
insisting on Western assistance to Ukraine in May 1998, did not see Ukraine as committed to reforms.
His matter-of-factly words that "probably, we have no more than five minutes to risk once more" is not
the most flattering reference to Ukraine as a country that should be rescued with substantial risk five
minutes before its collapse.
Poland is much more tolerant to the troubled reform process in Ukraine possibly because they had
some hard experience themselves. According to Ukrainian Ambassador to Poland Petro Sardarchuk,
Poland is among Ukraine's top three trading partners. About 200 Ukrainian-Polish joint ventures work
in Poland, and about 700 in Ukraine. Probably, that is the reason why Aleksandr Kwasniewsky
confined himself to admitting "some difficulties". In May 1997, ex-Prime Minister of Poland
Wlodzimerz Cimoszewicz spoke about Poland's intention to provide Ukraine with a ECU 20 million
technical assistance loan and described difficulties connected to that: "... we reminded about this offer
several times, but the Ukrainian party did not respond. This makes us uncomfortable: we do not know
how to view this silence. Either our partners are not interested in the offer or there are some other
reasons?" However, compared to statements of American and Western European politicians the Polish
leaders' comments sound amiable and indulgent.
Obviously, Ukraine and Poland do differ in their perspectives on some strategic issues, like the
situation with the planned Russian gas pipeline - alterative to the one currently going through Ukraine -
that would go though Belarus. Each of the countries has its own national interests. However, Poland
does not exaggerate the problem of Ukrainian illegal migrants, nor the problem of Ukrainian crime,
like Ukrainians do not blow up the issue of the would-be Russian-Polish "gas pipe".
The consistency of Polish policy towards Ukraine has an important explanation: the Polish political
elite and the society display consensus on foreign policy issues, policy towards Ukraine included. For
instance, the suggestion of chairman of the Interparliamentary Polish-Ukrainian Commission, member
of the Seim's Commission for Foreign Affairs Bohdan Borusevych following the dissolution of the
Belarusian parliament by Aleksandr Lukashenka that President of Poland, Ukraine and Lithuania could
act as intermediaries in the conflict found understanding of the Polish president. Leszek Balcerowich,
leader of the Unia Wolnosci, the only political parties that included a representative of ethnic
Ukrainians, Miroslaw Czech, in its election list, supports the Polish government's intention to re-orient
their interests from Russia to Ukraine. Before the 1998 parliamentary elections in Ukraine one of major
Polish newspapers expressed concern that the election involved "a threat that the pro-European and
close to Poland team will be removed from power". It is hardly possible now in Ukraine, where some
parliamentary leaders advocate not only foreign policy changes, but go further and suggest establishing
a Special Slavic Corps in the Crimea. Polish left-wingers, including Kwasniewsky himself, are first of
all "Polish", and only after that "left-wingers". This should be understood in Ukraine by those who
regarded the "left march" in Europe and in Poland as a hope for restoration of the Economic
Cooperation Union if not the Warsaw Pact. Oleksandr Moroz who claims to be consistent in his views
argued on November 20, 1995, that "the victory of a representative of the left forces at the presidential
elections in Poland is a natural process", must admit the continuity of Leck Valesa's and Aleksandr
Kwasniewsky's foreign policy. Otherwise Mr. Moroz will look like Communist leader Petro
Symonenko who kept asking President Kwasniewsky how much Poland had lost on the collapse of the
Economic Cooperation Union and never understood the Polish President's answer about how much it
had gained from integration into European structures.
Probably, there is some hidden symbolism in the fact that Presidents of Ukraine and Poland
commemorated victims of totalitarianism near Kharkiv, a city where father of Zbigniew Brzezinsky -
viewed with good reasons as an architect of Polish policy towards Ukraine - was the Consul of Rzech
Pospolyta during the years of "Jezhovshchina". Fates of politicians and fates of peoples meet. The point
is that there must be other symbols of achievements and success, without "difficulties" and "silence",
where "real reforms" will substitute "readiness for reforms". Symbols must fit the notion of strategic
partnership and the Declaration of reconciliation and Cooperation.
P.S. In May 1993, prominent Polish reformer Leszek Balcerowicz strongly refused the offer to work in
the Ukrainian government after Leonid Kuchma, then Prime Minister of Ukraine, invited him to
become his adviser. According to a Ukrainian information agency, head of the group of the Polish
Prime Minister's advisers Marek Dombrowsky said that Balcerowicz had explained his refusal by two
reasons: the lack of purpose in the Kuchma government and the lack of any radical changes in the
Ukrainian society. It looks like a similar offer, made to Balcerowicz by the current Ukrainian
government, would also be rejected: the leader of the Unia Wolnosci has a lot of his own things to do.
Though, he would probably repeat his reference to the purpose and changes.
